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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Recent Decisions
PARENT AND CHILD- RIGHT OF CHILD TO SUE THIRD PARTY
FOR LOSS OF PARENTAL AFFECTION
In Glettz v. Glettz,' the plaintiff, a minor, brought an action against
his paternal grandparents for the loss of the "love, affection, society, guid-
ance and companionship" of his father, alleging a willful and malicious
breaking up of the plaintiff's home. The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision sustaining the defendant's demurrer on the ground
that no cause of action was stated. The creation of such cause of action was
held to be a matter for legislative rather than judicial concern.
This is the first Ohio case raising the question of a child's right to sue a
third party for the alienation of affections of his parent.
When the question first came to the attention of an American court, m
1934, the right of action was denied the child.2 Courts in six other juris-
dictions, now including Ohio, have given this same answer.8
Four courts, however, have recognized a right of action by the child.4
The courts in this latter group base their decisions on: (1) the concept of
the family as an entity with mutual rights and duties among the members,
one right being that of the child to the affection, guidance and society of
his parents; (2) a recognition of a right of the child to the protection of the
integrity of the home and to the maintenance intact of his relations with his
parents against unwarranted interference by an outsider; and (3) the prin-
ciple of the flexibility of the common law in recognizing and enforcing a
right even when there is no precedent for the action.
The courts h6lding that the child has no cause of action arrive at this
conclusion for a variety of reasons: that the gist of an action for alienation
of affections where a spouse is plaintiff is the loss of consortium, and that
there is no right of consortium between child and parent;5 that, since the
child has no right of action against his parents for loss of parental society
'88 Ohio App. 337, 98 N.E.2d 74 (1951)
'Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934) In
Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 214 Pac. 400 (1923) the issue was raised but not
decided by the court. Also see Cole v. Cole, 277 Mass. 50, 177 N.E. 810 (1931).
'Edler v. MacAlpine-Downie, 180 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1950); McMillan v. Taylor,
160 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cit. 1946); Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A.2d 768
(1947); Nelson v. Richwagen, 95 N.E.2d 545 (Mass. 1950); Henson v. Thomas,
231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949); Gleitz v. Gleitz, 88 Ohio App. 337, 98
N.E.2d 74 (1951); Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). In
Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App.2d 454, 190 P.2d 984 (1948) and Katz v. Katz, 197
Misc. 412, 95 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1950) the child's right of action was held
barred by statute. Also see White v. Thomson, 324 Mass. 140, 143, 85 N.E.2d 246,
247 (1949)
'Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281
(W.D. Mich. 1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 111. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810
(1947); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).
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and affection, he should have none against the third party;" that to recognize
the right of action by the child would precipitate a flood of litigation;7 that
it would create a danger of fraudulent and extortionary suits; 8 that measur-
ing damages in such a case would be too difficult to warrant allowing the
action;' that permitting the suit would have no effect m deterring future
home breakers;10 that recent statutes barring alienation of affecutions actions
against the third party by an injured spouse" indicate a public policy ad-
verse to any extension of the action to children even in a state not having
such statute; 2 and that to recognize the new cause of action would be a usur-
pation of a legislative prerogatve.'3
These reasons will not stand analysis.
The issue should not be whether any techmcal right to consortium exists,
but whether the relational interest between child and parent is Important
enough to be protected legally against unwarranted interference by an out-
sider. '
Even if, because of policy considerations, the child's right to the affec-
tion of its parent cannot be enforced directly against the parent, the parent's
5Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 135, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912, 913 (Sup. Ct.
1934). Also see Madden, DomEsTic RELATIONS, § 56 (1931). "Consortium
means the compamonship or society of a wife the duties and obligations which
by marriage husband and wife take upon themselves towards each other conjugal
affection, society, and compamonship." Harris v. Kunkel, 227 Wis. 435, 437, 278
N.W 868, 869 (1938).
'Nelson v. Richwagen, 95 N.E.2d 545, 546 (Mass. 1950); Henson v. Thomas, 231
N.C. 173, 175, 56 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1949).
"Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 161, 56 A.2d 768, 770 (1947); Nelson v. Rich-
wagen, 95 N.E.2d 545, 546 (Mass. 1950); Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134,
135, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912, 914 (Sup. Ct. 1934). See 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 276,
277 (1934).
8Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 161, 56 A.2d 768, 770 (1947); Nelson v. Rich-
wagen, 95 N.E.2d 545, 546 (Mass. 1950). See 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 276, 277
(1934).
'Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 161, 56 A.2d 768, 770 (1947); Nelson v. Rich-
wagen, 95 N.E.2d 545, 546 (Mass. 1950). See 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 276, 277
(1934).
"'Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 135, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912, 914 (Sup. Ct.
1934).
'See for example: CAL. CiV. CODE, § 43.5 (1949); MICH. STAT. ANN., § 25.191
(1937); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT, § 6 1-a. These so-called "heart balm" statutes have
been interpreted to bar an action by the child as well as by the spouse. Rudley v.
Tobias, 84 Cal. App.2d 454, 190 P.2d 984 (1948); Katz v. Katz, 197 Misc. 412,
95 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct 1950). Contra: Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281
(W.D. Mich. 1949). Ohio has no such statute although "heart balm" bills have
been introduced several tumes in the legislature.
'Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 163, 56 A.2d 768, 771 (1947).
uHenson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 176, 56 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1949); Gleitz v.
Gleitz, 88 Ohio App. 337, 338, 98 N.E.2d 74 (1951); Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d
1012, 1015 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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immunity from suit exists because of his re1fationship to the child, and there
is no reason why the immunity should be extended to a person who is not a
member of the family.1  A husband cannot sue his wife for the loss of her
affection, but his right of action against a third party for the alienation of
affections of his wife is not barred for that reason. Another analogous
situation can be found where a plaintiff has an unenforceable contract, but
can sue a third person who interferes with that contractual relationship 6
The well-worn "flood of litigation" argument advanced by some courts
denying a cause of action seems, as usual, unsound. If the child ought other-
wise to have a right of action he should not be denied access to the courts
merely because a number of similar suits may arise." Likewise, the possi-
bility of fraudulent and extortionary litigation, while always present, can
be watched closely by the courts and should not bar plaintiffs with legiti-
mate claims.18
Difficulty in ascertaining the extent of damages should not be a suffi-
cient reason to bar completely a cause of action where the fact of injury is
certain;19 standards similar to those used in actions for alienation of affec-
tions where a spouse is plaintiff could be used to measure damages in an
action by a child for the alienation of affections of his parent.20
Because the primary purpose of the action is to compensate the injured
child for his loss, the recognition of the cause of action by the court should
not depend upon its efficacy in deterring future defendants from the same
conduct.21
Although a "heart balm" statute barring alienation of affections actions
may indicate a public policy opposed to granting a right of action in the
14 Green, Relatonal Interests, 29 ILL. L. Rv. 460 (1934)
Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 406, 37 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1949). See Henson
v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 179-180, 56 S.E.2d 432, 437 (1949) (dissenting opin-
ion).
"Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N.E. 125 (1901); Aalfo Co. v. Kinney,
105 N.J.L. 345, 144 At. 715 (1929); Rich v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R., 87 N.Y. 382
(1882)
"Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947); Miller v. Monsen,
228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186,
66 Ad. 202 (1907) Cf. Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 955 (1703). See 20
CORNELL L.Q. 255, 256 (1935)
'See Miller v. Levine, 130 Me. 153, 154 Ad. 174 (1931); 20 CoRNELL L.Q. 255,
256 (1935)
"Brandon v. Capital Transit Co., 71 A.2d 621 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1950); Stott
v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d. 864, 229 P.2d 348 (1951); Brown v. Lindsay, 228 P.2d
262 (Nev. 1951); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438
(1941)
"Mental anguish and injury to reputation are allowed as elements of damage in
alienation of affection suits. Nevins v. Nevins, 68 Kan. 410, 75 Pac. 492 (1904);
Adkins v. Kendrick, 131 Ky. 779, 115 S.W 814 (1909); Hartpence v. Rogers, 143
Mo. 623, 45 S.W 650 (1898) Inadequate or excessive verdicts are subject to re-
view by appellate courts. Keezer, MARRIAGE AND DivoRcE, 204 (3rd ed. 1946)
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